Review of "A Philosophical Disease"
By Carl ElliottRoutledge, 1999
Review by Christian Perring, Ph.D. on Nov 3rd 2000

One of the main themes of this book is that much of the debate in medical ethics is misguided, because it is based on a misunderstanding of the relation between morality and our practices. Elliott takes the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein as an model, or at least an inspiration, for how to do philosophy the right way. Exactly what that way is when it comes to medical ethics isn't always so clear; much of Elliott's discussion consists in setting out common sense and making insightful comments about particular issues. Of course, it is not surprising that it is hard to briefly summarize a "general antitheory of bioethics"; indeed, such difficulty seems inherent in Elliott's project. It also makes your humble reviewer's task more challenging in explaining Elliott's approach. After reading through the book once, I found myself browsing through it in a very non-linear manner, reading passages here and there, asking myself, "so what exactly is his central idea?" I'm still unsure whether I have completely grasped it.
A Philosophical Disease addresses various ethical issues, such as the use of Prozac for enhancement, whether deafness is really a disability, the moral responsiblity of people with personality disorders, the ability of depressed people to give informed consent to test trials of new antidepressant drugs, and living heart transplants. Elliott makes many worthwhile points, even if often his conclusions are quite slight. For instance, in his chapter on enhancement and normality, he ends by saying that there are no rigid distinctions between disability and difference, or cure and enhancement, but that we must pay attention to our biological nature. Most readers probably acknowledged that much at the start of the chapter. I am not holding Elliott at fault here, since I doubt that we can make strong arguments for definitive solutions to such controversies. Indeed, I am sympathetic to Elliott's central starting point that we can't place much confidence in the "great philosophical theories," such as Kant's deontology, Mill's utilitarianism, or Aristotle's virtue ethics. Elliott is postmodernist enough to be suspicious of the "grand narratives" of modernism, and his tone is pleasingly tentative, with touches of irony and self-deprecation all the way through his book.
Elliott's ultimate aim in discussing these sorts of cases is as part of his philosophical examination of how to resolve ethical issues in the real world. He is interested in the methodology of bioethics, and he is unsatisfied with the way bioethics is normally carried on. There is some diversity in approaches of bioethics, but it is all too common to see someone trot out the four principles outlined by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. These principles, autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, are then applied to the problem at hand; the crank is turned and out pops the answer. But Elliott is also critical of the debate about other sorts of mainstream bioethical debates; for example that about the definition of personhood of fetuses. It seems to me that this is a critical sort of case for his argument (largely because it is here that I start to disagree with him), but it is precisely at such a point that the central message seems to lose focus.
The question at issue is how to go about resolving problems in medical ethics. Elliott is suspicious not just of grand theories, but apparently of all philosophical theorizing. But it is very hard to see why Elliott's alternative approach doesn't count as philosophical theorizing, or if he really rejects theorizing, then what alternative he is proposing. Take the case of the moral status of a fetus. Elliott says it is a mistake to think that we can rationally discover whether or not a fetus has the moral status of a person by inspecting our conception of a person, finding the necessary and sufficient criteria of personhood, and then seeing if a fetus meets those criteria. He says,
This is not to say that producing lists of criteria for personhood or friendship is going to completely settle all the ethical questions associated with personhood or friendship. Of course the debate will proceed, and the moral assumptions of different sorts of analyses will be uncovered. But such theorizing and philosophizing is, as far as I can see, the best way to proceed. Indeed, in much of his discussion of cases of ethical problems in A Philosophical Disease, that is how Elliott himself proceeds. I conclude that Elliott is overplaying his hand; his conception of how we should go about doing philosophy, as embodied in his own practices rather than his theory, is not as anti-theoretical as he suggests.